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  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/03%3A_Spatial_interactions_on_a_grid
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/01%3A_Introduction
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/03%3A_Spatial_interactions_on_a_grid/3.04%3A_Other_types_of_neighborhoods_and_other_revision_protocols
    In what concerns the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the above results also prove that the promotion of cooperation in this game is not robust against changes in the update rule, because the beneficial effect of ...In what concerns the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the above results also prove that the promotion of cooperation in this game is not robust against changes in the update rule, because the beneficial effect of spatial lattices practically disappears for rules different from unconditional imitation, when seen in the wider scope of the ST plane.
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/02%3A_Our_first_agent-based_evolutionary_model/2.02%3A_Extension_to_any_number_of_strategies
    The payoffs of the game are determined by the user in the form of a matrix [ [A 00 A 01 … A 0n ] [A 10 A 11 … A 1n ] … [A n0 A n1 … A nn ] ] containing the payoffs A ij that an agent playing strategy ...The payoffs of the game are determined by the user in the form of a matrix [ [A 00 A 01 … A 0n ] [A 10 A 11 … A 1n ] … [A n0 A n1 … A nn ] ] containing the payoffs A ij that an agent playing strategy i obtains when meeting an agent playing strategy j (i, j ∈ {0, 1, …, n}). This procedure is called at the end of setup to plot the initial distribution of strategies, and then also at the end of procedure to go, to plot the strategy distribution at the end of every tick.
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/00%3A_Front_Matter
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/03%3A_Spatial_interactions_on_a_grid/3.01%3A_Spatial_chaos_in_the_Prisoner's_Dilemma
    This payoff will be the number of C-players in the set my-nbrs-and-me times the payoff obtained with a C-player, plus the number of D-players in the set times the payoff obtained with a D-player. Note...This payoff will be the number of C-players in the set my-nbrs-and-me times the payoff obtained with a C-player, plus the number of D-players in the set times the payoff obtained with a D-player. Note: To use the same dimensions as Nowak and May (1992), you can change the location of the NetLogo world’s origin to the bottom left corner, and set both the max-pxcor and the max-pycor to 199.
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/02%3A_Our_first_agent-based_evolutionary_model/2.04%3A_Interactivity_and_efficiency
    Before doing so, we have to remove the declaration of the global variable n-of-players in the Code tab, since the creation of the slider implies the definition of the variable as global. In constrast,...Before doing so, we have to remove the declaration of the global variable n-of-players in the Code tab, since the creation of the slider implies the definition of the variable as global. In constrast, in the old version all revisions within the same tick made use of the payoffs computed at the beginning of the tick, using the strategy distribution at the beginning of the tick.
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)
    A guide to implement and analyze Agent-Based Models within the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, using NetLogo
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/01%3A_Introduction/1.04%3A_The_fundamentals_of_NetLogo
    to setup clear-all ;; clear the world create-turtles 3 ;; make 3 turtles ask turtle 0 [ fd 10 ] ;; tell the first one to go forward 10 steps ask turtle 1 [ ;; ask the second turtle (with who number 1)...to setup clear-all ;; clear the world create-turtles 3 ;; make 3 turtles ask turtle 0 [ fd 10 ] ;; tell the first one to go forward 10 steps ask turtle 1 [ ;; ask the second turtle (with who number 1) set color green ;; ... to become green ] ask patch 2 -2 [ ;; ask the patch at (2,-2)... set pcolor blue ;; ... to become blue ] ask turtle 0 [ ;; ask the first turtle (with who number 0) create-link-to turtle 2 ;; to link to turtle with who number 2 ] ask link 0 2 [ ;; ask the link between turtle …
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/01%3A_Introduction/1.01%3A_Introduction_to_evolutionary_game_theory
    In stark contrast, dynamics are at the core of EGT: the outcomes of the game shape the distribution of strategies in the population, and this change in distribution modifies the relative success of di...In stark contrast, dynamics are at the core of EGT: the outcomes of the game shape the distribution of strategies in the population, and this change in distribution modifies the relative success of different strategies when the game is played again.
  • https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Applied_Mathematics/Agent-Based_Evolutionary_Game_Dynamics_(Izquierdo_Izquierdo_and_Sandholm)/02%3A_Our_first_agent-based_evolutionary_model/2.01%3A_Our_very_first_model
    At the end of the setup procedure, we should include the primitive reset-ticks, which resets the tick counter to zero (and also runs the “plot setup commands”, the “plot update commands” and the “pen ...At the end of the setup procedure, we should include the primitive reset-ticks, which resets the tick counter to zero (and also runs the “plot setup commands”, the “plot update commands” and the “pen update commands” in every plot, so the initial state of the model is plotted):

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