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Section 7.6: Plurality-with-Elimination Method

  • Page ID
    219582
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    Learning Objectives
    • Determine the winner of an election using the plurality-with-elimination method

     


    We've now studied two voting methods, and each has revealed serious flaws:

    Plurality Method:

    • ✗ Vulnerable to vote splitting and spoiler effects
    • ✗ Ignores all preference information beyond first choice
    • ✗ Can elect candidates opposed by large majorities
    • ✗ Violates the Condorcet Criterion

    Borda Count Method:

    • ✗ Violates the Majority Criterion (can override clear majorities)
    • ✗ Highly vulnerable to strategic manipulation
    • ✗ Violates the Condorcet Criterion

    Let's introduce another voting method called the plurality-with-elimination method:

    Major Voting Method #3 - Plurality-with-Elimination

    Plurality-with-Elimination (also called Instant Runoff Voting or IRV, or Ranked Choice Voting or RCV) attempts to simulate what would happen if we held multiple rounds of voting, eliminating the weakest candidate after each round, until someone achieves a majority.

    • Step 0: Collect Ranked Ballots (if a preference table is not given)
      • Voters rank candidates in order of preference:
        • 1st choice (most preferred)
        • 2nd choice
        • 3rd choice
        • And so on...

    Voters don't have to rank all candidates—partial rankings are allowed in most implementations.


    • Step 1: Count First-Place Votes (Round 1)
      • Count how many voters ranked each candidate first.
        • Check for majority winner:
          • If any candidate has more than 50% of first-place votes → That candidate wins immediately
          • If no candidate has a majority → Proceed to elimination

    • Step 2: Eliminate the Weakest Candidate
      • Identify the candidate with the fewest first-place votes and eliminate them from the race.
        • Transfer their votes:
          • Find all ballots that ranked the eliminated candidate first
          • Look at each ballot's next preference (second choice)
          • Transfer those votes to the next-ranked candidate still in the race
          • If a ballot's second choice is also eliminated, go to the third choice, and so on

    • Step 3: Recount with Transferred Votes (Round 2)
      • Count the votes again, now including:
        • Original first-place votes for remaining candidates
        • Transferred votes from eliminated candidate's supporters
          • Check for majority winner:
            • If any remaining candidate now has more than 50%That candidate wins
            • If no candidate has a majority → Continue elimination process

    • Step 4: Repeat Until a Winner Emerges
      • Continue the cycle:
        1. Eliminate the candidate with fewest votes
        2. Transfer their votes to next preferences
        3. Recount
        4. Check for majority
          • Continue until: One candidate achieves more than 50% of the remaining votes.
          • That candidate is declared the winner.

    Traditional runoff elections require a second election whenever no candidate receives a majority of the votes. However, holding a second election can be expensive, time-consuming, and often results in lower voter turnout. Ranked-choice voting addresses this issue by allowing voters to rank candidates in order of preference on a single ballot. Using these rankings, the election simulates multiple rounds of runoff voting by eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes and redistributing those ballots according to the voters’ next choices. This process continues until one candidate receives a majority of the votes.

    Example #7.6.1 🤔

    Consider the following preference table with Candidates A, B, & C:

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates A, B, and C
    Number of Voters 6 5 3
    First Choice B C A
    Second Choice C A C
    Third Choice A B B

    Use the plurality-with-elimination method to determine a winner..


    ✅ Solution:
    • Step 0: A preference table was given, so preference ballots have been counted.
    • Step 1:  Count first-place votes. (Round 1)
      • Candidate A received 3 out of 14 first place votes or 21.4%
      • Candidate B received 6 out of 14 first place votes or 42.9%
      • Candidate C received 5 out of 14 first place votes or 35.7%
        • So, no majority winner.
    • Step 2:  Eliminate the weakest candidate.

    Candidate A received the fewest first place votes, so eliminate Candidate A by removing them from the table.

    Preference ballot removing candidate A
    Number of Voters 6 5 3
    First Choice B C  
    Second Choice C   C
    Third Choice   B B

    Then move up all other candidates in the next available slots and remove the last row.

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates B and C
    Number of Voters 6 5 3
    First Choice B C C
    Second Choice C B B
    • Step 3: Count first-place votes. (Round 2)
      • Candidate B received 6 out of 14 first place votes or 42.9%
      • Candidate C received (5 + 3) = 8 out of 14 first place votes or 57.1%
        • So, a majority exists.

    Thus, Candidate C is the winner by the plurality-with-elimination method.

    Example #7.6.2 ðŸ¤”

    A survey of 23 customers was conducted asking them to rank which protein they prefer at a local Chipotle restaurant. The results are listed below:

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates Barbacoa, Carnitas, Chicken, and Steak
    Number of Voters 8 7 5 3
    First Choice Steak Carnitas Chicken Steak
    Second Choice Chicken Barbacoa Carnitas Barbacoa
    Third Choice Barbacoa Chicken Steak Chicken
    Fourth Choice Carnitas Steak Barbacoa Carnitas

    Use the plurality-with-elimination method to determine a winner.


    ✅ Solution:
    • Step 0: A preference table was given, so preference ballots have been counted.
    • Step 1:  Count first-place votes. (Round 1)
      • Steak received (8 + 3) = 11 out of 23 first place votes or 47.8%
      • Carnitas received 7 out of 23 first place votes or 30.4%
      • Chicken received 5 out of 23 first place votes or 21.7%
      • Barbacoa received 0 out of 23 first place votes or 0%
        • So, no majority winner.
    • Step 2:  Eliminate the weakest candidate.

    Barbacoa received the fewest first place votes, so eliminate Barbacoa by removing them from the table.

    Preference ballot removing candidate Barbacoa
    Number of Voters 8 7 5 3
    First Choice Steak Carnitas Chicken Steak
    Second Choice Chicken   Carnitas  
    Third Choice   Chicken Steak Chicken
    Fourth Choice Carnitas Steak   Carnitas

    Then move up all other candidates in the next available slots and remove the last row.

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates Carnitas, Chicken, and Steak
    Number of Voters 8 7 5 3
    First Choice Steak Carnitas Chicken Steak
    Second Choice Chicken Chicken Carnitas Chicken
    Third Choice Carnitas Steak Steak Carnitas
    • Step 3: Count first-place votes. (Round 2)
      • Steak received (8 + 3) = 11 out of 23 first place votes or 47.8%
      • Carnitas received 7 out of 23 first place votes or 30.4%
      • Chicken received 5 out of 23 first place votes or 21.7%
        • So, no majority winner.
    • Step 4: Repeat Until a Winner Emerges
      • Eliminate the weakest candidate.

    Chicken received the fewest first place votes, so eliminate Chicken by removing them from the table.

    Preference ballot removing candidate Chicken 
    Number of Voters 8 7 5 3
    First Choice Steak Carnitas   Steak
    Second Choice     Carnitas  
    Third Choice Carnitas Steak Steak Carnitas

    Then move up all other candidates in the next available slots and remove the last row.

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates Carnitas and Steak
    Number of Voters 8 7 5 3
    First Choice Steak Carnitas Carnitas Steak
    Second Choice Carnitas Steak Steak Carnitas
    • Step 3 (Repeated): Count first-place votes. (Round 3)
      • Steak received (8 + 3) = 11 out of 23 first place votes or 47.8%
      • Carnitas received (7 + 5) = 12 out of 23 first place votes or 52.2%
        • So, a majority exists.

    Thus, Carnitas is the winner by the the plurality-with-elimination method.

    Example #7.6.3 🤔

    City council members need to choose a new location for the city's community center. Four sites are being considered:

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for Downtown, Eastside, Northside, and Westside
    Number of Voters 35 30 20 15
    First Choice Downtown Northside Eastside Westside
    Second Choice Northside Eastside Westside Eastside
    Third Choice Eastside Westside Northside Northside
    Fourth Choice Westside Downtown Downtown Downtown

    Use the plurality-with-elimination method to determine a winner.


    ✅ Solution:
    • Step 0: A preference table was given, so preference ballots have been counted.
    • Step 1:  Count first-place votes. (Round 1)
      • Downtown received 35 out of 100 first place votes or 35%
      • Northside received 30 out of 100 first place votes or 30%
      • Eastside received 20 out of 100 first place votes or 20%
      • Westside received 15 out of 100 first place votes or 15% 
        • So, no majority winner.
    • Step 2:  Eliminate the weakest candidate.

    Westside received the fewest first place votes, so eliminate Westside by removing them from the table.

    Preference ballot removing candidate Westside
    Number of Voters 35 30 20 15
    First Choice Downtown Northside Eastside  
    Second Choice Northside Eastside   Eastside
    Third Choice Eastside   Northside Northside
    Fourth Choice   Downtown Downtown Downtown

    Then move up all other candidates in the next available slots and remove the last row.

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for Downtown, Eastside, and Northside
    Number of Voters 35 30 20 15
    First Choice Downtown Northside Eastside Eastside
    Second Choice Northside Eastside Northside Northside
    Third Choice Eastside Downtown Downtown Downtown
    • Step 3: Count first-place votes. (Round 2)
      • Downtown received 35 out of 100 first place votes or 35%
      • Northside received 30 out of 100 first place votes or 30%
      • Eastside received (20 + 15) = 35 out of 100 first place votes or 35%
        • So, no majority winner.
    • Step 4: Repeat Until a Winner Emerges
      • Eliminate the weakest candidate.

    Northside received the fewest first place votes, so eliminate Northside by removing them from the table.

    Preference ballot removing candidate Northside
    Number of Voters 35 30 20 15
    First Choice Downtown   Eastside Eastside
    Second Choice   Eastside    
    Third Choice Eastside Downtown Downtown Downtown

    Then move up all other candidates in the next available slots and remove the last row.

    Preference ballot showing voter rankings for Downtown and Eastside
    Number of Voters 35 30 20 15
    First Choice Downtown Eastside Eastside Eastside
    Second Choice Eastside Downtown Downtown Downtown
    • Step 3 (Repeated): Count first-place votes. (Round 3)
      • Downtown received 35 out of 100 first place votes or 35%
      • Eastside received (30 + 20 + 15) = 65 out of 100 first place votes or 65%
        • So, a majority exists.

    Thus, Eastside is the winner by the plurality-with-elimination method.

    Section 7.6: Plurality-with-Elimination Method [In-Class Exercises]
    1. Consider the following preference table with Candidates A, B, & C:

      Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates A, B, and C
      Number of Voters 7 6 6 5 3
      First Choice C B A B A  
      Second Choice A A B C C
      Third Choice B C C A B

      Use the plurality-with-elimination method to determine a winner.

    2. A group of 41 people is choosing where to eat lunch during their meeting. The four fast food delivery options are: Board & Brew, Naugles, T.K. Burgers, or In-N-Out Burgers. Each voter ranks the restaurants from most preferred to least preferred.

      Preference ballot showing voter rankings for candidates Board & Brew, In-N-Out, Naugles, and T.K. Burgers
      Number of Voters 11 9 8 6 4 3
      First Choice In-N-Out T.K. Burgers Naugles Board & Brew T.K.Burgers In-N-Out
      Second Choice Naugles Naugles T.K.Burgers T.K. Burgers In-N-Out T.K. Burgers
      Third Choice T.K. Burgers Board & Brew In-N-Out In-N-Out Naugles Board & Brew
      Fourth Choice Board & Brew In-N-Out Board & Brew Naugles Board & Brew Naugles

      Use the plurality-with-elimination method to determine a winner.

    Answers
    1. Candidate A wins.
    2. T.K. Burgers wins.


    Section 7.6: Plurality-with-Elimination Method is shared under a not declared license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by LibreTexts.

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